Can negotiations prevent fish wars?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Can negotiations prevent fish wars?
zbMATH Open document ID: 0951.90050
DOI: 10.1016/S0925-2312(99)00108-3
author: K. Sneek
author: Harold Houba
author: Felix Várdy
publication date: 2000-08-21T00:00:00Z
review text: The standard alternating offer model is extended by integrating it with the Levhari and Mirman fish war model in order to investigate negotiations over fish quota. The disagreement actions are endogenous. The interior and linear Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) results in immediate agreement on an efficient path of fish quota. This MPE is not analytically tractable. Numerical solutions show that patience is a disadvantage in this MPE and small differences in patience lead to large asymmetries in the bargaining outcome.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B70
zbMATH DE Number: 1493220
zbMATH Keywords: Markov perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0925-2312(99)00108-3
OpenAlex ID: W2040635652
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1493220