\(k\)-price auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: \(k\)-price auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0968.91003
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2001-09-14T00:00:00Z
review text: In the paper the problem of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategies in \(k\)-price auctions (\(3\leq k\)) is considered, under the assumptions of independent private values and various attitudes of agents toward risk. The authors prove that there is at most one continuous symmetric equilibrium in these games and provide its characterization. Earlier results obtained by \textit{J. H. Kagel} and \textit{D. Levin} [Econ. J. 103, 868-879 (1993)] are generalized, i.e., it is proved for \(k=3\) and distribution functions satisfying some technical conditions that (1) agents with any attitude toward risk overbid in equilibrium and (2) if the agents are risk averse, then the bids are decreasing with the number of participants.
reviewed by: Anna Gomolińska
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
zbMATH DE Number: 1496333
zbMATH Keywords: \(k\)-price auction
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium strategy
author: Dov Monderer
author: Moshe Tennenholtz
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1999.0747
OpenAlex ID: W1985837920
cites work: Q4197800
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cites work: Monotone Comparative Statics
cites work: Distributed games
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0747
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1496333