Absorbing team games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Absorbing team games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1006.91013
author: Eilon Solan
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-02-28T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper demonstrates the existence of a uniform equilibrium payoff in absorbing team games, supported by relatively simple strategy profiles. Absorbing games are stochastic games where all states but one are absorbing: a stage game is played repeatedly, but for each action profile there is a chance that the process is absorbed into a state where all players receive a fixed payoff forever after. Absorbing team games are absorbing games played by two teams: formally, the set of players may be partitioned into two sets, and the players of each set have the same payoffs (although not necessarily the same action sets). In the equilibrium strategy profiles the players have to play a small perturbation of a stationary mixed-action combination and to test whether deviations occur, the tests being designed so that the probability of false detection of a deviation is small; if a deviation is detected the deviant is punished forever. The result is technically a by-product of a previous result of the author, where he proves an analogous result for three-player absorbing games [Math. Oper. Res. 24, 669-698 (1999; Zbl 1064.91500)], and is part of a broader research project which the author and Nicholas Vieille are pursuing on the deep question of the existence of equilibrium payoffs in general stochastic games.
reviewed by: Salvatore Modica
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1496334
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic games
zbMATH Keywords: stage game
zbMATH Keywords: deviations
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2017586877
cites work: The Symmetric Rendezvous-Evasion Game
cites work: Q3823402
cites work: The Big Match
cites work: On N-person stochastic games by denumerable state space
cites work: Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games
cites work: Q3786238
cites work: Repeated games with absorbing states
cites work: Repeated games of incomplete information: The symmetric case
cites work: Q4896915
cites work: A rendezvous-evasion game on discrete locations with joint randomization
cites work: Q5666358
cites work: Stochastic games
cites work: Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: the general symmetric case.
cites work: Noncooperative Stochastic Games
cites work: Three-Player Absorbing Games
cites work: Perfect information stochastic games and related classes
cites work: Team-maxmin equilibria
cites work: On equilibria in repeated games with absorbing states
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0748
Recommended article: Three-Player Absorbing Games
Recommended article: Q4464563
Recommended article: Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games
Recommended article: On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Recommended article: On equilibria in repeated games with absorbing states
Recommended article: Team-maxmin equilibria
Recommended article: Correction to: ``Layered networks, equilibrium dynamics, and stable coalitions''
Recommended article: Q4352344
Recommended article: Q4464565
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1496334