Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers
zbMATH Open document ID: 0957.91033
author: Mehmet Bac
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-09-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/25031
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 1507737
zbMATH Keywords: sequential equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: delay
zbMATH Keywords: restrictive agenda
zbMATH Keywords: first-round separating equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: buyer-seller bargaining game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2091291986
DOI: 10.1007/S001990050336
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1507737