Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
zbMATH Open document ID: 0966.91020
author: Hongbin Cai
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2001-08-20T00:00:00Z
review text: The author considers a 2-stage bargaining game. On one side of the bargaining is a constituency, represented by an agent; on the other side, an adversary. After the first stage of bargaining, the constituency can retain or replace the agent. In general, a continuum of sequential equilibria exists for this game. The paper considers a strong refinement of sequential equilibrium, then characterizes the equilibria that survive refinement. The equilibria most likely to be played display considerable inefficiency, which takes the form of delayed agreement. The paper includes an application to the labor-management negotiations, including the bitter UAW strike of 1945-46.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1508332
zbMATH Keywords: 2-stage bargaining game
zbMATH Keywords: agent
zbMATH Keywords: strong refinement of sequential equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1999.2631
OpenAlex ID: W2088445524
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2631
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1508332