Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
zbMATH Open document ID: 1032.91033
author: Shinji Ohseto
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2004-03-11T00:00:00Z
review text: The author characterizes two classes of strategy-proof mechanisms for the provision of a fixed-sized public project. First it is considered the case of a nonexludable public project. It is proved that constant cost sharing is a necessary condition for strategy-proofness and individual rationality in the \(n\)-agent case. The unanimous mechanisms are characterized as the set of strategy-proof, individual rational and citizen sovereign mechanisms. Then the case of an excludable public project is considered. The author proves that semiconstant cost sharing is a necessary condition for strategy-proofness in the two-agent case and it is a necessary condition for strategy-proofness, individual rationality and demand monotonicity in the \(n\)-agent case. The largest unanimous mechanisms is characterized as the set of strategy-proof, individual rational, demand-monotonic and access-independent mechanisms. Comparing the two classes of mechanisms, the author concludes that admitting partial exclusion always improves efficiency.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 1515523
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: excludability
reviewed by: Aleksandr D. Borisenko
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1999.0755
OpenAlex ID: W2043684662
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0755
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1515523