Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
The author characterizes two classes of strategy-proof mechanisms for the provision of a fixed-sized public project. First it is considered the case of a nonexludable public project. It is proved that constant cost sharing is a necessary condition for strategy-proofness and individual rationality in the \(n\)-agent case. The unanimous mechanisms are characterized as the set of strategy-proof, individual rational and citizen sovereign mechanisms. Then the case of an excludable public project is considered. The author proves that semiconstant cost sharing is a necessary condition for strategy-proofness in the two-agent case and it is a necessary condition for strategy-proofness, individual rationality and demand monotonicity in the \(n\)-agent case. The largest unanimous mechanisms is characterized as the set of strategy-proof, individual rational, demand-monotonic and access-independent mechanisms. Comparing the two classes of mechanisms, the author concludes that admitting partial exclusion always improves efficiency.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1515523
scientific article