Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stability of equilibria in games with procedurally rational players
zbMATH Open document ID: 0956.91025
author: Rajiv Sethi
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2000-10-10T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 1515525
zbMATH Keywords: bounded rationality
zbMATH Keywords: stable equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game dynamics
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: game.1999.0753
OpenAlex ID: W3124453114
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0753
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1515525