On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
zbMATH Open document ID: 0960.91052
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00263-9
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2000-10-26T00:00:00Z
review text: A sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem, i.e. two-sided one-to-one matching with non transferable utility. For small economies this condition is also necessary. This class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 1521689
zbMATH Keywords: marriage problem
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: uniqueness
author: Jan Eeckhout
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Marriage and Class
cites work: On the existence of stable roommate matchings
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Q3995616
cites work: Q3999327
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1521689