Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
zbMATH Open document ID: 0984.91031
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00301-3
author: Helmut Bester
author: Roland Strausz
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2000-10-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1521751
zbMATH Keywords: revelation principle
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: limited commitment
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
cites work: Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
cites work: Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
cites work: Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
full work available at URL: s0165-1765(00)00301-3
OpenAlex ID: W2084205975
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1521751