Participation constraints in adverse selection models
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Participation constraints in adverse selection models
zbMATH Open document ID: 0970.91036
author: Bruno Jullien
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: A characterization is provided of the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter's reservation utility depends on his type. The information rent is non-monotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade. Conditions are determined for the optimal contract to be separating, non-stochastic and to induce full participation. The results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition.
reviewed by: Giacomo Bonanno
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 1525176
zbMATH Keywords: agency contract
zbMATH Keywords: adverse selection
zbMATH Keywords: uncertainty
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1999.2641
OpenAlex ID: W2095109474
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2641
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1525176