Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
zbMATH Open document ID: 1103.91340
author: Anil Arya
author: Uday Rajan
author: Jonathani Glover
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper studies implementation in a principal-agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal-agent models (compared to general implementation models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation. We also construct simple implementing mechanisms that rely on the single crossing property and on assumptions about the outcome set frequently made in the principal-agent literature.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1525179
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2000.2648
OpenAlex ID: W2001848964
cites work: Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
cites work: A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings
cites work: Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
cites work: Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
cites work: Implementing action profiles when agents collude
cites work: Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
cites work: Virtual Bayesian Implementation
cites work: Bayesian implementation: The necessity of infinite mechanisms
cites work: A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating
cites work: Bayesian Implementation
cites work: Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
cites work: Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
cites work: Regularity and Stability of Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
cites work: Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
cites work: Stopping agents from ``cheating''
cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
cites work: Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
cites work: Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
cites work: Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
cites work: Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
cites work: Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
cites work: Implementation of first-best allocations via generalized tax schedules
cites work: Implementation in differential information economies
cites work: Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
cites work: Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
cites work: The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2000.2648
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1525179