Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
zbMATH Open document ID: 1006.91038
author: Yeon-Koo Che
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2001-01-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 1556513
zbMATH Keywords: contract
zbMATH Keywords: hold-up problem
zbMATH Keywords: investments
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2030385061
cites work: Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
cites work: Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
cites work: After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
cites work: Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
cites work: Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
cites work: Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
cites work: Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
cites work: Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0782
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1556513