Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
zbMATH Open document ID: 1047.91045
author: Guoqiang Tian
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: \textit{J. E. Roemer} and \textit{J. Silvestre} [J. Econ. Theory 59, No. 2, 426--444 (1993; Zbl 0771.90026)] introduced the notion of the proportional solution for general convex economies with both private and public ownership with endogenous profit distributions, which generalizes in some sense the Walrasian equilibrium principle. Like the Walrasian mechanism the proportional solution mechanism is not incentive-compatible. This paper investigates the incentive aspect of the proportional solutions for general convex economies using mechanisms, in which Nash allocations and also strong Nash allocations coincide with proportional allocations. The new model is explicitely described and the results are given with full proofs. Some open questions are added.
reviewed by: Alfred Göpfert
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
zbMATH DE Number: 1556519
zbMATH Keywords: incentive-compatible mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto allocation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2127763530
cites work: Q5722776
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0777
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1556519