Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
zbMATH Open document ID: 0983.91034
author: Roberto Serrano
author: Oscar Volij
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-04-23T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper under review deals with the properties of optimal allocation in an exchange economy with perfect competition where agents are arbitragers aiming at upset this allocations imaging plausible beneficial trades. The main concept of the paper is ``interactive choice set'' which is a feasible set being constructed endogenously by the agent's desires of arbitrage. It is shown that an allocation is competitive if and only if each agent chooses optimally over the interaction choice set. The paper also offers an analysis of different behavioral assumptions underlying the Walrasian allocations, and an explanation for the source of competitive prices.
reviewed by: Milan Mareš
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B52
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
zbMATH DE Number: 1556611
zbMATH Keywords: exchange economy
zbMATH Keywords: perfect competition
zbMATH Keywords: Walrasian equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: interactive choice set
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2151822041
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2000.2680
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1556611