Coherent cost-sharing rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coherent cost-sharing rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 0981.91050
author: Yves Sprumont
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2002-03-05T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/469
review text: The author considers the problem of allocating the cost of a bundle of goods or services among a set of customers, taking an axiomatic approach. A discrete model is considered, and various aspects are discussed that do not arise in continuous models from cooperative game theory or within the framework of Aumann-Shapley models.
reviewed by: Albrecht Irle
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1556923
zbMATH Keywords: cost-sharing model
zbMATH Keywords: coherence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2046276699
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1998.0760
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1556923