Saddle points and active equilibriums in differential games with dependent strategies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Saddle points and active equilibriums in differential games with dependent strategies
zbMATH Open document ID: 0973.91008
published in: Doklady Mathematics
publication date: 2001-01-28T00:00:00Z
review text: A two-person zero-sum differential game with mixed strategies is considered. The movement equation is also overaged with respect to mixed strategies. The set of admissible pairs of the players' pure strategies is a proper subset of its Cartesian product. In this sense the players' strategies are dependent. The author defines a notion of dependent saddle points as boundary points of the set of active equilibriums. The latter set was defined in the author's previous papers. The necessary conditions for the existence of a dependent saddle point and for the optimality of a boundary point of the set of active equilibriums are given.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 49N70
zbMATH DE Number: 1557647
zbMATH Keywords: dependent constraints
zbMATH Keywords: differential games
zbMATH Keywords: mixed strategies
zbMATH Keywords: saddle points
zbMATH Keywords: active equilibria
author: È. R. Smol'yakov
reviewed by: N. M. Novikova
MaRDI profile type: Publication
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1557647