A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
zbMATH Open document ID: 1050.91073
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-06-04T00:00:00Z
review text: It is proved that the set of stable matchings in a two-sided matching market is a distributive lattice under the common preferences of all agents on any one side of the market. The main conditions assumed are the path-independence and a new property called ``cardinal-monotonicity''.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 1748972
zbMATH Keywords: stable matchings
zbMATH Keywords: choice function
zbMATH Keywords: lattice
author: Ahmet U. Alkan
reviewed by: Anton Ştefănescu
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001990100179
OpenAlex ID: W2126206231
DOI: 10.1007/S001990100179
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748972