Bilateral bargaining. Theory and applications
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bilateral bargaining. Theory and applications
zbMATH Open document ID: 0996.91003
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-56160-3
author: Stefan Napel
published in: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
publication date: 2002-05-23T00:00:00Z
review text: The book is a monograph on two person bargaining. Roughly half of the book is a useful exposition of selective aspects of bilateral bargaining theory including non-cooperative approaches to bargaining theory as well as models of evolutionary game theory. Aside from staple topics such as Nash's bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodonsky solution, Rubinstein's alternating offers model and so forth, it also includes an overview of earlier contributions of Edgeworth, Zeuthen and Hicks and concludes with a section on empirical and experimental researches relating to the theory sections. The chapter provides detailed analytical exposition and discusses models and results with an eye to achieving a critical synthesis. The remainder of the book consists of three chapters and an appendix. The material for these chapters are, generally speaking, based on the author's, and co-authors', works in these areas. The first of these chapters is closely related to the expository chapter, building on the ultimatum minigame, dealt with in the section on evolutionary game models in chapter 1. It combines a stochastic evolutionary game setup with satisficing behaviour formulation in a two person bargaining situation. It is an adaptive behaviour type model in which each player satisfices, that is sticks to past action if it has provided a payoff larger than his aspired payoff otherwise there is a positive probability of swiching out of the past action; the probability of sticking to the past action is a decreasing function of the gap between the actual and aspired payoff. The aspiration levels are endogenously determined; they adapt to the gap between realized and aspired levels of payoff; aspiration levels rise if actual payoff exceeds the aspired level and falls, otherwise. In addition, there may be present perturbations or random shifts in the aspiration levels. The stationary distribution of the associated Markov process is investigated. When perturbations occur rarely and aspirations are …
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-02
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A07
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1745057
zbMATH Keywords: bilateral bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: satisficing
zbMATH Keywords: adaptive behaviour
zbMATH Keywords: power indices
zbMATH Keywords: inferior player
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56160-3
OpenAlex ID: W4210732126
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1745057