Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
zbMATH Open document ID: 1022.91001
author: Jeffrey S. Banks
author: John Duggan
author: Michel Le Breton
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-06-06T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1802/1033
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91C99
zbMATH DE Number: 1751407
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: undominated strategy
zbMATH Keywords: uncovered set
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2051818828
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2825
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1751407