Distributive politics and electoral competition
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Distributive politics and electoral competition
zbMATH Open document ID: 1031.91024
author: Jean-François Laslier
author: Nathalie Picard
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-02-27T00:00:00Z
review text: The institution of electoral politics is considered. The authors use the classical Downsian model of electoral competition in which two parties compete for the vote of the electorate in a symmetric zero-sum, perfect information game. This paper raises the question of the level of inequality generated by Downsian competition for redistribution. The apparatus of a general spatial model of elections is applied. In the division problem the basic results are threefold: 1. The authors derive how far one can go by sticking to pure strategies and narrowing the set of possible outcomes on the basis of dominance-like arguments; 2. optimal strategies are exhibited; 3. the authors offer a sample of quantitative estimates of how unequal the distributions proposed at equilibrium are.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1751408
zbMATH Keywords: distributive politics
zbMATH Keywords: electoral competition
zbMATH Keywords: Downsian model
Wikidata QID: Q60680561
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2000.2775
OpenAlex ID: W2091647285
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2000.2775
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1751408