Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1031.91107
author: Andrea Prat
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-02-27T00:00:00Z
review text: A microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies is introduced. The model is used to: (1) determine the relation between campaign spending and the deviation from the median voter's preferred policy; (2) show the informational value of lobbies' contributions; (3) evaluate the welfare implications of restricting compaign spending; (4) interpret the empirical finding that campaign expenditures have a very low effect on election outcome.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 1751410
zbMATH Keywords: politician
zbMATH Keywords: rational voter
zbMATH Keywords: multiple lobby
zbMATH Keywords: model
zbMATH Keywords: campaign finance
zbMATH Keywords: common agency
zbMATH Keywords: elections
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2001.2793
OpenAlex ID: W3087895245
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2793
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1751410