Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
zbMATH Open document ID: 1031.91023
author: Bhaskar Dutta
author: Matthew O. Jackson
author: Michel Le Breton
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-02-27T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors study the impact of strategic choices of self-interested candidates of whether or not to enter an election. Their main interest is the strategic candicay in the context of the tree and binary voting procedures used by small groups such as committees. It is shown that the outcomes under strategic candidacy still remain in the top cycle (i.e. select a Condorcet winner if one exists). A comprehensive analysis for the special case of voting by successive elimination is offered.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 1751411
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: successive elimination
zbMATH Keywords: strategic candidacy
zbMATH Keywords: candidacy game
zbMATH Keywords: tree and binary voting procedure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2032912904
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2862
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1751411