Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1021.91011
author: Roger B. Myerson
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-10-09T00:00:00Z
review text: The main part of the paper considers voting systems where voters vote for three candidates in a normalized \((A,B)\) point-based system. That is, each voter gives 1 point to the most favored candidate, 0 points to the least favored candidate and either \(A\) or \(B\) points (where \(0\leq A\leq B \leq 1\)) to the remaining candidate. This scenario covers plurality, Borda, negative voting and approval voting, among other rules. The author is interested in the consequences of choosing different values for \(A\) and \(B\). The voters are divided into types and the number of voters is given by a Poisson distribution. The author considers limits of equilibria if the (mean) number of voters tends to infinity. The main assumption is that the voters act to maximize the expected utility, rather than voting sincerely, and so are most concerned about the impact of their points (and thus vote most strongly) on close, or serious, races. The author shows that, depending on the values of the parameters \(A\) and \(B\), various undesirable outcomes occur in the simple case where there are only two types of voters.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 1751412
zbMATH Keywords: plurality
zbMATH Keywords: number approval voting
zbMATH Keywords: scoring rule
zbMATH Keywords: Poisson game
zbMATH Keywords: candidate
zbMATH Keywords: serious race
reviewed by: Duncan J. Melville
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2001.2830
OpenAlex ID: W2054135491
cites work: The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
cites work: Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
cites work: Population uncertainty and Poisson games
cites work: Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
cites work: Large Poisson games
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2830
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1751412