Insurance market games: Scale effects and public policy
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Insurance market games: Scale effects and public policy
zbMATH Open document ID: 1035.91038
DOI: 10.1007/BF01236065
author: Michael R. Powers
author: Shun Tian Yao
author: Martin Shubik
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 1998-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The authors use a game-theoretic model to study various effects of scale and their public-policy implications in an insurance market. After showing that a unique equilibrium exists under certain conditions for the case in which both buyers and sellers have constant absolute risk aversion, they consider the special case in which the insurers are risk neutral, and analyse how the price and quantity of insurance, as well as other quantities, are affected by the number of insurance firms, the number of customers, and the total amount of capital provided by investors.
reviewed by: Taizhong Hu
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1760567
zbMATH Keywords: insurance market games
zbMATH Keywords: scale effects
zbMATH Keywords: public policy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market
cites work: A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategles
cites work: A theory of risk, return and solvency
cites work: On the tradeoff between the law of large numbers and oligopoly in insurance
cites work: Two-person insurance negotiation
cites work: Q3843228
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01236065
OpenAlex ID: W1978945043
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1760567