A simple selling and buying procedure
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A simple selling and buying procedure
zbMATH Open document ID: 1010.91080
author: David Pérez-Castrillo
author: Marilda Sotomayor
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-06-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1760700
zbMATH Keywords: matching model
zbMATH Keywords: assignment model
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2000.2783
OpenAlex ID: W2039274946
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2000.2783
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1760700