Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1010.91016
DOI: 10.1007/BF01232420
author: Luca Lambertini
author: Dan Sasaki
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 2002-10-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1761865
zbMATH Keywords: penal codes
zbMATH Keywords: security level
zbMATH Keywords: product differentiation
zbMATH Keywords: positivity constraints
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1761865