The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 1011.91015
author: Michele Piccione
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-07-04T00:00:00Z
review text: The aim of this paper is to analyze a repeated prisoner's dilemma game in which the actions of the players are monitored privately and imperfectly. A partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1763747
zbMATH Keywords: repeated prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: folk theorem
reviewed by: N. G. Gamkrelidze
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.2001.2819
OpenAlex ID: W2002756427
cites work: Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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cites work: Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
cites work: Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2819
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1763747