Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 1011.91014
author: R. Smith
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-07-04T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 0661.pdf
review text: The authors investigate repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. In this games the players can use public signals to coordinate their behavior, and thus support cooperative outcomes, but with private monitoring, such coordination may no longer be possible. Even though grim trigger is a Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE) in games with public monitoring is often fails to be an equilibrium in arbitrarily close games with private monitoring. If a PPE has player's behavior conditioned only on finite histories, then it induces an equilibrium in all close-by games with private monitoring. This implies a folk theorem for repeated games with almost-public almost-perfect monitoring.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1763751
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: perfect public equilibrium
reviewed by: N. G. Gamkrelidze
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3125337029
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2869
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1763751