An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1100.91505
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00077-X
author: Baoline Chen
author: Peter A. Zadrozny
publication date: 2002-07-15T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper derives and illustrates a new suboptimal-consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game. This solution lies in the same solution space as the infinite-horizon, dynamic-programming, feedback solution but puts the leader in a preferred equilibrium position. The idea comes from \textit{F. Kydland} [J. Econ. Theory 15, 307--324 (1977; Zbl 0375.90089)] who suggested deriving a consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game by varying the coefficients in the player's linear constant-coefficient decision rules. Here feedback is understood in the sense of setting a current control vector as a function of a predetermined state vector. The proposed solution is derived for discrete- and continuous-time games and is called the anticipative feedback solution. The solution is illustrated with a numerical example of a duopoly model.
reviewed by: Tadeusz Radzik
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
zbMATH DE Number: 1768095
zbMATH Keywords: suboptimal-consistent feedback solution
zbMATH Keywords: discrete--time games
zbMATH Keywords: continuous-time games
zbMATH Keywords: duopoly model
describes a project that uses: minpack
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1768095