Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1131.91363
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00576-6
author: Bernardo Moreno
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2002-07-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
zbMATH DE Number: 1768279
zbMATH Keywords: Endowments
zbMATH Keywords: Population-monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: Uniform rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0165-1765(01)00576-6
OpenAlex ID: W2151679727
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1768279