Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
zbMATH Open document ID: 1416.91031
author: Susanne Goldlücke
author: Sebastian Kranz
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-10-31T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: refs4786969000000000423.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6969689
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic games
zbMATH Keywords: relational contracting
zbMATH Keywords: monetary transfers
zbMATH Keywords: computation
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect public monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: perfect public equilibria
describes a project that uses: repgames
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3125553552
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-017-1060-1
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6969689