Extending tournament solutions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Extending tournament solutions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91192
author: Felix Brandt
author: Markus Brill
author: Paul Harrenstein
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2018-11-07T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 05C90
zbMATH DE Number: 6974467
zbMATH Keywords: social choice functions
zbMATH Keywords: majoritarian functions
zbMATH Keywords: tournament
zbMATH Keywords: conservative extension
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-018-1112-x
OpenAlex ID: W2184922637
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-018-1112-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6974467