Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91184
author: Dodge Cahan
author: Arkadii Slinko
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2018-11-07T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.02787
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B72
zbMATH DE Number: 6974470
zbMATH Keywords: multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: Hotelling-Downs spatial election model
zbMATH Keywords: best-worst voting rules
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2530848721
arXiv ID: 1610.02787
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-018-1115-7
description: scientific article