Inequity-averse agents' deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Inequity-averse agents' deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91412
author: Biao Luo
author: C. Y. Wang
author: Tieshan Li
published in: Annals of Operations Research
publication date: 2018-11-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D30
zbMATH DE Number: 6976344
zbMATH Keywords: inequity aversion
zbMATH Keywords: deserved concerns
zbMATH Keywords: social networks
zbMATH Keywords: behavioral agency model
zbMATH Keywords: operating systems
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10479-017-2436-0
OpenAlex ID: W2588390336
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DOI: 10.1007/S10479-017-2436-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6976344