Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91229
author: Vinicius Carrasco
author: Vitor Farinha Luz
author: Nenad Kos
author: Matthias Messner
author: Humberto Moreira
author: Paulo Monteiro
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-11-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 6980963
zbMATH Keywords: optimal mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: robustness
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: individual rationality
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity aversion
zbMATH Keywords: moment conditions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2018.05.005
OpenAlex ID: W2807601023
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Wikidata QID: Q129739174
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6980963