An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91226
author: Oleg Baranov
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-11-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6980970
zbMATH Keywords: combinatorial auctions
zbMATH Keywords: iterative auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Vickrey auction
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic auctions
zbMATH Keywords: ascending auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2018.07.005
OpenAlex ID: W2883804650
cites work: The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data
cites work: Q3241303
cites work: The package assignment model.
cites work: Ascending price Vickrey auctions
cites work: On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
cites work: Q3208356
cites work: Incentives in Teams
cites work: The English auction with differentiated commodities
cites work: Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
cites work: On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
cites work: Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
cites work: Q3588651
cites work: The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
cites work: Q4421000
Wikidata QID: Q129488366
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.07.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6980970