Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91196
author: Mikhail Safronov
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-11-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/1091507
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6980975
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: internalizing externalities
zbMATH Keywords: coalition-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: full implementation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2885061541
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Wikidata QID: Q129427003
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.07.009
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6980975