Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91159
author: Nicholas C. Yannelis
author: Luciano I. de Castro
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-11-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 6980976
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity aversion
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: first-best
zbMATH Keywords: second-best
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2018.02.008
OpenAlex ID: W2791503549
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Wikidata QID: Q130185596
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.02.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6980976