The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91293
author: Tadashi Hashimoto
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-11-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6980977
zbMATH Keywords: ex post incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: random allocation
zbMATH Keywords: random priority
zbMATH Keywords: large market
zbMATH Keywords: rational expectations equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2018.08.002
OpenAlex ID: W3122933663
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.08.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6980977