Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Financial contracting with enforcement externalities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91539
author: Lukasz A. Drozd
author: Ricardo Serrano-Padial
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-11-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: paper 1362.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91G50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6981014
zbMATH Keywords: contract enforcement
zbMATH Keywords: default spillovers
zbMATH Keywords: credit crunch
zbMATH Keywords: credit cycles
zbMATH Keywords: global games
zbMATH Keywords: heterogeneity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2185150822
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Wikidata QID: Q129253747
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.09.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6981014