Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91230
author: Yeon-Koo Che
author: Daniele Condorelli
author: Jinwoo Kim
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-11-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: wc-JET-02-04-18.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6981023
zbMATH Keywords: weak cartels
zbMATH Keywords: weakly collusion-proof auctions
zbMATH Keywords: optimal auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1562618743
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.09.005
Wikidata QID: Q129156454
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6981023