A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A continuous-time optimal insurance design with costly monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 1418.91252
author: Hisashi Nakamura
author: Koichiro Takaoka
published in: Asia-Pacific Financial Markets
publication date: 2018-12-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
zbMATH DE Number: 6987582
zbMATH Keywords: insurance
zbMATH Keywords: costly monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: fraudulent claims
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10690-014-9184-9
OpenAlex ID: W2123165316
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DOI: 10.1007/S10690-014-9184-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6987582