Cultural transmission and extortion
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cultural transmission and extortion
zbMATH Open document ID: 1418.91083
author: Garret Ridinger
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-12-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: This paper explores the role of cultural transmission in extortion. Extortion is modeled as an asymmetric contest where individuals from one group attempt to take from individuals in another group. Using a model of cultural transmission, this paper finds the existence of a unique asymptotically stable equilibrium where there are a fraction of people who defend against extortion and a fraction of people who take from others. The degree of extortion is decreased when: (1) extortion is less effective; (2) socialization efforts of parents who resist are more effective; and (3) socialization efforts of parents who abstain from extortion are more effective. A key finding is the existence of a complementarity between the effectiveness of socialization. When socialization is more effective for resisting extortion and choosing not to extort, there is a much larger reduction of extortion than either increase could achieve alone. This provides a potential explanation for why some countries like Singapore and Hong Kong were able to greatly reduce corruption and suggests potential policy applications.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D10
zbMATH DE Number: 6991163
zbMATH Keywords: cultural transmission
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Keywords: contests
zbMATH Keywords: extortion
zbMATH Keywords: corruption
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g9030049
OpenAlex ID: W2883917858
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Wikidata QID: Q129560415
DOI: 10.3390/G9030049
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6991163