Coordination and private information revelation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coordination and private information revelation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1418.91094
author: Debdatta Saha
author: Prabal Roy Chowdhury
published in: Games
publication date: 2018-12-10T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a battle-of-the-sexes coordination game. There is a close connection between the extent of information revelation and the possibility of coordination failure; while, in the absence of any coordination failure, there exist equilibria with full disclosure, in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium with no information revelation. We provide a purification argument for the non-existence result, as well demonstrate that it is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6991178
zbMATH Keywords: private information revelation
zbMATH Keywords: coordination
zbMATH Keywords: strategic uncertainty
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: g9030064
OpenAlex ID: W2891849603
cites work: Q4936751
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DOI: 10.3390/G9030064
Wikidata QID: Q129288589
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6991178