Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
zbMATH Open document ID: 1403.91034
author: Shun Kurokawa
author: Joe Y. Wakano
author: Yasuo Ihara
published in: Theoretical Population Biology
publication date: 2018-12-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 6989218
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: finite populations
zbMATH Keywords: generosity
zbMATH Keywords: fixation probability
zbMATH Keywords: public goods games
zbMATH Keywords: mathematical model
zbMATH Keywords: one-third law
zbMATH Keywords: prisoner's dilemma
Wikidata QID: Q39892311
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.tpb.2010.03.002
OpenAlex ID: W1990336455
cites work: The Evolution of Cooperation
cites work: Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
cites work: Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
cites work: The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
cites work: The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
cites work: Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
cites work: Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
DOI: 10.1016/J.TPB.2010.03.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6989218