Bidding for incentive contracts
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bidding for incentive contracts
zbMATH Open document ID: 1418.91275
author: Benoît Julien
author: Guillaume Roger
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2018-12-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6996284
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: contracts
zbMATH Keywords: bidding
zbMATH Keywords: directed search
zbMATH Keywords: constrained efficiency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2018.05.001
OpenAlex ID: W2804776403
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Wikidata QID: Q129805169
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.05.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6996284