Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
zbMATH Open document ID: 1418.91388
author: Battal Doğan
author: Bettina Klaus
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2018-12-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 6996289
zbMATH Keywords: affirmative action
zbMATH Keywords: consistency
zbMATH Keywords: favoring-higher-ranks
zbMATH Keywords: immediate acceptance mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: non-bossiness
zbMATH Keywords: resource-monotonicity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2018.04.001
OpenAlex ID: W3123463491
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Wikidata QID: Q129965555
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.04.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6996289