Sequential interactions -- in which one player plays first and another responds -- promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sequential interactions -- in which one player plays first and another responds -- promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1397.92502
author: Robert A. Laird
published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology
publication date: 2018-06-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 6890084
zbMATH Keywords: alternating games
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Keywords: indirect invasions
zbMATH Keywords: simultaneous games
zbMATH Keywords: spatial models
Wikidata QID: Q88679701
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jtbi.2018.05.007
OpenAlex ID: W2803581398
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2018.05.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6890084