State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing
zbMATH Open document ID: 1390.91318
author: Edina Berlinger
author: Anita Lovas
author: Péter L. Juhász
published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research
publication date: 2018-06-15T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/2185/
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91G50
zbMATH DE Number: 6890227
zbMATH Keywords: contract theory
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: crowding out
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2228274439
cites work: Corporate financing under moral hazard and the default risk of buyers
cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
cites work: Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
cites work: The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
cites work: Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
DOI: 10.1007/S10100-016-0461-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6890227